The global minimum tax under the OECD’s Pillar Two rules is changing what tax incentives can do in Southeast Asia. A 2026 study on foreign direct investment in the region describes the shift plainly: when an effective tax rate drops below 15%, the difference is collected as a top-up tax somewhere, and the host that granted the tax holiday is usually the one that must collect it. That logic directly weakens the traditional “tax holiday” lever that many investment agencies used to market locations. The same study documents adoption and incentive redesign across the five largest ASEAN economies: Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, with Pillar Two applied across the region from 2024–2025.
This policy change is arriving alongside measurable shifts in effective tax rates under the current framework. In July 2026, the OECD published analysis estimating that average jurisdiction-level effective tax rates rise by 2.8–3.7 percentage points on average under the global minimum tax, with effective tax rates in investment hubs estimated to rise by 5.5–6.9 percentage points. The same release cites initial post-implementation 2024 data suggesting positive effective tax rate impacts, and reports no statistically significant evidence of reductions in investment or employment among in-scope firms during the first year of implementation. That early evidence matters for ASEAN debates, because the region’s incentive competition has often leaned on low effective tax outcomes rather than on direct, transparent support.
From Rate Cuts to Refundable Credits: ASEAN’s New Incentives Playbook
By 2026, the redesign trend is increasingly about “tax to cash.” A regional incentives roundup frames the practical comparison this way: first classify the investor as a Pillar Two in-scope multinational enterprise versus an out-of-scope SME. For in-scope groups, the relevant comparison shifts toward Qualified Refundable Tax Credits (QRTCs) and cash grants in absolute terms, while concessionary rates and holidays still matter more for out-of-scope firms. Vietnam is presented as a clear example of the pivot. The roundup notes that Decree 182/2024 created an Investment Support Fund positioned as the Pillar Two response, including QRTC support described as 30% of R&D and 50% of semiconductor/AI initial investment.
Thailand and Indonesia illustrate how “old” and “new” incentives can stack and still be marketed, even as the minimum tax changes outcomes for large multinationals. The same roundup notes that Thailand’s EEC adds a 50% corporate income tax cut for five years plus a flat 17% personal income tax for foreign experts, and it also flags a local production offset that rises from 1:2 in 2026 to 1:3 in 2027. For Indonesia, PMK 69/2024 is described as extending tax-holiday submissions to 31 December 2025, with tiers from IDR 100 bn (50% corporate income tax, five years) up to IDR 500 bn+ (100% corporate income tax, five to 20 years). In practice, these offers now need to be evaluated through the global minimum tax lens for in-scope groups, not just through the headline rate reduction.
Policy makers are also being pushed toward more careful design choices, not just bigger offers. The OECD’s 2026 review of investment policies in ASEAN emphasizes that the evolving global tax landscape, including the global minimum tax, may influence the role of both tax and non-tax incentives in investment promotion. It warns that the impact on incentive policies depends on a variety of factors, calling for careful analysis so countries can best consider their options. That message aligns with academic work on Pillar Two implementation: by January 2026, 59 countries had introduced at least one element of the global minimum tax, and research is explicitly assessing how the reform affects multinational decisions on investment location, investment size conditional on location, and profit shifting. In 2026, the ASEAN story is less about whether incentives continue, and more about whether incentives remain effective once tax holidays stop delivering a lasting effective tax advantage for large groups.
Why do tax holidays matter less under Pillar Two for large multinationals in ASEAN?
What does the OECD estimate the global minimum tax does to effective tax rates?
How is Vietnam repositioning incentives as the minimum tax spreads across ASEAN?
What changes in Thailand’s incentives are highlighted for 2026 and 2027?
How should investors think about the ASEAN global minimum tax Pillar Two when comparing incentives in 2026?